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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In Distr ict Court Civil Number 4939, the Distr ict 
Court granted the Respondent's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, f inding that the Complaint failed to state a cause of 
action against the Respondent because no duty was owed with 
regard to the insurance proceeds. 
Appellant f i led a second Complaint based solely on 
negligence (Distr ic t Court Civi l Number 5052), and the court 
dismissed the same; again f inding that the Respondent owed no 
duty to the Appellant with respect to the insurance proceeds and 
that the f i r s t Complaint was res judicata of the second. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of both of the i 
above-stated Orders of the Distr ict Court . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS < 
Respondent approves and agrees with the statement 
of facts contained in the Appellant's Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
I . 
THE RESPONDED 1 , * - ? i r.S'f b k N 
N A T I O N A L B A N K , OWED Mo i r f - p THF 
APPELLANT WITH REGARD rn ^ r . p / , < ; - , , ,K 
OF T l IE I N S U R A N T P R O T H ' L . 
The essent ial issue in these consol idated annM* 
c. x i s t e i i c e o i I a e k o f d t 11) o i i p a r • t o f 11 \ e R e s p o n r J e n i , ! • s * 
W e s t e i ( \ N a 1: i o i i a I B a i i k (I \ e i e i i i a f t e i i e f e r r e c 
escrow age* i t , to dispose of insurar ice proce^cJ--. * »<:co:ianc< v i t h 
• e a I e s t a 1: e c o i 111 a c t b e t w e e i i A p p e 11 a n t a n d f -'— • i • J»'> • o 
issue of the appl icabi l i ty o f res j u d i c a t a , a i t l • » <o> •• i 
here i i \, is not whol ly d i s p o s i t i v e , as t l le f i r s t ot <^ <? o l idated 
<ases was IIIIHII JII i| i|i>i let II In II In i II 11 oi t nun ( I he 'Vpnr l l i in! « nnifcnds 
that the Chriiik owed both .t con t rac tua l and ex del ic to d u t \ to 
d i sbu rse the insurance proceeds to h i m , hold them -tl his d i sposa l , 
re t i i i ii I Inn 11 In flu insurance company mi i i ' i s ' n . n n i to 
Appe l lan t , I ho Respondent contends thai the escrow con t rac t 
executed In, Iho p .o l ios sets t o i l h Iho under ta lu ru i of the H<mk 
and the re fo re the lu l l measure of its hutuo-, and ob l igat ions to the 
Appe l l an t . Tha t cont- * * e x p r e ^ l v abso'v• •<< • * h - ^ the 
c 4 • > I in 
accordance w i t h **-'«•
 t Oo\ estate * i » * \ ' . K •. 
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A. The Respondent Bank Owed No Duty or 
Obligation To The Appellant With Respect To The Insurance 
Proceeds. 
As is apparent from the Memorandums of Points and 
Authorit ies submitted by both parties in each case presented to 
the tr ia l cour t , i t is undisputed that an escrow depository is the 
agent of both parties to a real estate contract. Ford v . Guarantee 
Abstract and Tit le Company, 553 P.2d 254 (Ks. 1976), National 
Bank of Washington v . Equity Investors, 506 P.2d 20 (Wa. 1973). 
The dispute arises as to the conclusion that may be drawn from 
this concept. 
Because the relationship of an escrow depository is ' 
that of an agent to his pr inc ipa l , the general rules of agency law 
control the determination of the scope of the duties and obligations 
owed to that pr inc ipal . The preva i l ing, in fact overwhelming, i 
view is that the scope of the agency relationship and therefore the 
matters about which f iduciary obligations are owed is determined 
by the agreement between the part ies. State Auto Insurance and i 
Casualty Underwri ters v . Sal isbury, 494 P.2d 529 (Ut . 1972), 
Williams v . Pilgrim Turkey Packers, 503 P.2d 710 (Or. 1972), 
Suitts v . First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. 602 P.2d 53 ( I d . \ 
1979), Lloyd v . Southwest Underwr i ters , 169 P.2d 238 (NM 1946). 
The escrow agreement extant between Appellant and 
First Western National Bank (R,20-22) unequivocally limited the < 
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scope o1 ' tl le agency to rece ip t and d\\ >bursemei it of tl le ii istalln nei i ts 
due 01 i tl ie real estate con t rac t a n d , upor i fi i l l and final payi i lent, 
a o f 1:! i e ci o c i 11 i i e i 11: s i i e c e s s a r y It o > e s t 1 e q a i t ii 11 e ii it i 11 n c 
vendee 11 s p e c i f i c a 11 y r e I i e v e ci 11 i e B a i I k f r o i n 11 i e o b I i g a t i o r i o f 
e n f o r c i n q a i i y o t \ i e r p r o v i s i o i i o f t h e t e a 1 e s t a t e c o n t r a c t a n d 
11 i e r e f o n e o f c o i 111 o 11 i i i q 11 \ e d i s b t i r s e n i e i \ t ::i 1 ' 11 i e i i i s i 11 a i \ c e 
proceeds. 
The Appellant ^ K a n c e s me i i ^ *' ~n. me 
insurance p roceed c shos * « • v o a r t t^ptpr i PC ,
 I(.-. * i -non+ 
p a y m e n > \ - * M , . •* *<• , > • € • " ^ - t ^ t o < . o * * ' ' " . < • ' , " ( v s * h e c i ' 
o • • * . 
the escrow agreeme -i wh ich identifies '--n- .-,* r"*v(-c* l u n d s <\<- ' h t - . ^ 
installment payment '>»;•',. ^,r- .
 ( - - - M • *-<• ^p -v --str>t< f *^ f * . 
Vi II i ii II e 11 i e IE! a i i k i s i i o t s u g g e s 1: i i i g 11 i a 1: a I  i i r i i p s i 11 i i p a y i i i e i 11: \ o i J I oil 
not have beer i tt eated as fi; it ids subject to t l ie escrow , i t does 
b e l i e v e n i d i -> h t - • ,.,.- i . J f c - \ . • . . . . . < - : - • • . »r.^- H • y 
t h e v e n d e e t ».r i ' . » v " " - < . < ; ; * r . * , M • * v H ' t - v r i ^ 
t h e B a n k l f ' ' - s (< , | )n ( . f h ' ^ r - r n ^ - i ^ ^ n f A-JS r:; + ,»:<V ! h o i r ^ - ' <•' 
tl ie es * -' «• 
Appellant -:-a - >enc ;Ur DU*-.,*<* J. •*. ( >• .(iret-mont tha-' s-jch 
proceeds were to be applied to tl ie escrov/, foi t l ie Bar ik to 
p r e s i J irn (> t ii v e II > I:a I ce s i i c I i ; ::i < : t i o i i < "< f o i 11 d b e co i 111 a t ) 1:o 11 I e escrow 
agreement term absolving tl ie Bai ik : fror i i ei i fo rc i i ig that agreen ici i t . 
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The matter of insurance against f i re and casualty loss and the 
disposition of any proceeds therefor were clearly beyond the 
purview of the escrow agreement. 
The Appellant also argues that the Bank exceeded 
the author i ty conferred upon it by the escrow agreement and cites 
several cases which expound the proposition that such action 
subjects an escrow agent to l iabi l i ty . Again the Bank does not 
quarrel with that general rule of law. However, none of the cases 
cited by the Appellant nor any found by the Bank in which such 
an issue was decided, would impose l iabi l i ty here. In those cited 
by the Appel lant, l iabi l i ty was found when the escrow agent took 
action with respect to the subject matter of the escrow but such 
action exceeded or was contrary to the express instruct ion of the 
escrow agent's pr inc ipal . For example, in Tucson Tit le Insurance 
Company v . D'Ascoli, 383 P.2d 984 (Az. 1962), cited by the 
Appellant at page 10 of his Br ief , the escrow instructions required 
the agent to conclude certain steps as conditions precedent to the 
purchase of a mortgage. If those steps were not completed within 
f i f teen days, the mortgage was not to be purchased and the agent 
was to await fur ther instruct ions. Contrary to those express 
inst ruct ions, the escrow agent purchased the mortgage without 
concluding the required conditions precedent. The case now 
before the court is clearly distinguishable from Tucson Tit le and 
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sinnlfii cases, lm illln* , u l i ] u 1 in<i!h i ml I i i i mi l cast ialt^ loss 
insurance was nol .. p<ut - 1 Mu i I M H I W aqreemet i t ai id r 10 
ins t r 11< I mi i w i ' ip qiv- f i i re la t ive t h n i o t o , 
A case most s imi lar lo l l ic ins tant case is Cocke v L 
Transamenca T i t le Company f'iMi [ \ ? d 4bb I A / . ' • • ; ' • In ( o r k e , 
the s r l l n 1 r f i ra l p r o p e r t y 1'n's , < ,i- "i id1 irr n Hie h inds 
he 1 cl ii in i escrow as a resu 11 o 1 ' deI ay s ii m i cI osi ng 11 Ie sa Ies 
t r a n s a c t i o n . I I le bi lyet agreed to t l lis advance bt i t to p ro tec t his 
i n te res t In the evei i t 11 ie escrow dicl i »o 1: cI!ose, dei i iai icle cl ai id 
rece ived a p romissory note r ep resen t i ng the an tout i t o f f i inds 
a cl \ f a i i c e cl t o t If i e s e 11 e m 1 1 i e s e 11 e i e v e r 11 \ i a 11 \ * i e f i i s e cl it o c i o s e and 
1: h e e s c r o w a q e t I 1: ii i i 11 11 i i r e f u s e cl t o i e I e a s e a r i y d o c u m e i I t s o r 
f unds to e i ther p a r t y , I l owever , the $40,000.00 promissory ' ^ ote 
was 'never \ lelcl iiii i esci • :>v an iici c • Il ' • :::cn n se, t l ie llbii \\ - ei expec ted 
payment thereon II \ ie seller b r o u g h t si j i t aga ins t t l ie escr ow 
<v , ' -ii ,- ! i ; l in esi * • the 
$40,000 " i * i* - n J. IU' ^ - r . • * ' : .** < m^r was <i ' •••* i<h 
*'** ,ui~ni * ^ M : H V ^bl igat iO'^ •>" •>•* ' - o r eg l iqence. 
h ions 
si lent .*-. * M I mortgage - ^ -» 11^- ioini«* -i * ^ 
t r a n c e > w.«*, <:<- * •* f h ^ ^ - » « . ,^« ' ^ u e T o r t - i..c j y u r . : ..^ 
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B. The Bank Owed No Duties Apart From Those 
Set Forth In The Escrow Agreement and Ar is ing By Implication 
Therefrom. 
The Appellant's second point on appeal is that the 
Bank owed a duty of due care as a matter of law, apart from the 
escrow agreement, which duty included exercising control over the 
insurance proceeds. The Respondent stands by the proposition that 
while a duty of due care ex is ted, it was owed only with respect to 
the subject matter of the escrow. See: Sell On Agency, page 115, 
E. S. Harper Company v . General Insurance Company of America, 
430 P.2d 658 ( I d . 1967). 
The Appel lant, in ci t ing Biadi v . Lawyers' Tit le , 
Insurance Company, 374 So.2d 30 (Fla. App. 1979) and DCR 
Incorporated v . Peak Alarm Company, 663 P.2d 433 (Ut. 1983), 
argues that in any contractual relationship there exists a duty of , 
due care apart from the express mutual obligations contained 
in the agreement. This is stated most succinctly and appropriately 
for this case in State Insurance and Casualty, supra. In State
 ( 
Insurance and Casualty, the court held that an agent owes his 
principal the implied in law duties of reasonable care, di l igence, 
competence, and good faith in addition to those obligations ( 
expressly stated in the contract. However, the court did not f ind 
that these enumerated duties extend beyond the stated 
subject matter of the agency. In the DCR Incorporated case cited { 
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by the Appel lant, the court he ld, quoting from the Restatement 
(Second) of Tor ts : 
One who undertakes, gratui tously or for 
consideration to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the 
protection of the others person or th ings , is 
subject to l iabil i ty to the other for physical 
harm result ing from his fai lure to exercise 
reasonable care to perform his under tak ing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
and from Vol . 1981, Number 1 , B .Y .U . L. Rev. 33, 36: 
The duty concept limits defendant's l iabi l i ty to 
a claim arising out of part icular relationships 
and r isks. In professional negligence cases, a 
contract with the client most often creates a 
relationship in which the duty of care arises. 
However, the defendant's total l iabi l i ty is not 
based upon breach of contract but rather upon 
violation of the legal duty independently 
imposed as a result of what the defendant 
undertook to do with relation to the plaint i f f 's 
interest. (Emphasis-added.) 
Thus the duty of due care that exists v is-a-v is an established 
contractual relationship is bounded at its outer limits by the scope 
of the relationship measured by the agreement of the part ies. 
The Appellant would also have this court f ind that 
a duty existed as a result of the application of the "Rescue 
Doctr ine". In support of this theory , the Appellant states that 
because the Bank endorsed the check for the insurance proceeds, 
i t undertook the duty to insure proper disbursement. This 
argument is specious. It is precisely because of the Bank's 
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endorsement that the Appellant feels a duty was breached. It is 
because the Bank did not undertake the duty that the Appellant 
fi led this lawsuit. The Appellant cannot create a duty to act from 
the mere fai lure to act. 
I I . 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BARRED 
ALL PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE APPELLANT'S 
SECOND COMPLAINT. 
The Respondent contends that both Complaints f i led by 
the Appellant (case numbers 19503 and 19794) allege the same 
cause of action and therefore the second Complaint was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. The Appellant argues that because 
the court in its Order dismissing the f i r s t Complaint did not 
specifically mention the issue of negligence; and thus the issue 
was not actually raised and decided, it is not res judicata of the 
second Complaint. The Bank submits tha t , in fact , the issue was 
raised and l i t igated; however, even i f i t were not , the bar sti l l 
applies. Apart from the ident i ty of causes of action requirement, 
no other requisites for the application of the doctrine are in 
dispute. 
The doctrine of res judicata is applicable to bar a 
second lawsuit wherein a f i rs t lawsuit containing the same cause of 
action has reached final determination. The courts have posited 
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numerous cr i ter ia for use in determining i f causes of action have a 
common ident i ty ; the most common being whether both are founded 
on the same transaction or occurrence; i . e . , whether by one 
wrong a single r ight has been in f r inged, and whether this may be 
established by the same facts and circumstances in both actions. 
See: Tomiyasu v . Golden, 400 P.2d 414 (Nv. 1965), Wilson v . 
Bramblett, 371 P.2d 1014 (Az. 1962), Wells v . Ross, 465 P.2d 966 
(Ks. 1970), Waxwing Cedar Products, L td . v . Koenckey, 564 P.2d 
1061 (Or. 1977), Houser v . Southern Idaho Pipe and Steel, Inc . , 
646 P.2d 1197 ( I d . 1982). In both Complaints fi led by the 
Appellant, the same transaction forms the basis of the claim. That 
transaction is the Bank's endorsement of the insurance proceeds 
check. The f i rs t Complaint, as admitted by the Appellant, alleged 
negligence, as did the second; and the facts and circumstances 
necessary to establish either claim would be identical. Since the 
f i rs t Complaint alleged negligence on the part of the Bank, it is 
not disposit ive, nor even relevant, that the t r ia l courts dismissal 
order did not specifically state that the Appellant had no cause of 
action based on negligence. Stating that no cause of action 
existed as p led, when the Complaint alleged negligence, is 
suff ic ient. The judge's order was a final judgment on the merits 
and barred a second lawsuit. Cf: McBride v . State of Colorado 
Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division, 626 P.2d 760 (Co. 
1981), Whitecraft v . Simenza, 399 P.2d 757 (Mt. 1965), Torres v . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kennecott Copper Corporat ion, 488 P.2d 477 (Az. 1971). 
In his br ie f , the Appellant quotes Wheadon v . 
Pearson, 376 P.2d 946 (Ut. 1962), for the proposition that an 
issue must be raised and decided to be res judicata. However, 
this is only t rue i f there is f i rs t a determination that the causes of 
action are not identical. The quoted language begins with that 
caveat. Furthermore, that an issue is not raised and l i t igated 
does not mean that the causes of action are not the same. Res 
judicata not only bars issues actually raised and l i t igated, but so 
long as the causes of action are the same, bars those that might 
have been raised and l it igated as wel l . Richards v . Hodson, 485 
P.2d 1044 (Ut. 1971), Bellaston v . Texaco, Inc . , 521 P.2d 379 
(Ut . 1974). 
CONCLUSION 
In consideration of the foregoing, the Respondent 
respectful ly requests that the t r ia l courts' Orders in cases number 
19503 and 19794 be aff i rmed. 
DATED this 1st day of Jijme, 1984. 
Respectfuffy^^ubmitted, 
Blair ^ wooers 
Coffman & Coffman, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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